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This paper looks at the quality of forecasts/assessments made by some 
of the recent Finance Commissions for the shareable central taxes and 
own  tax  revenues  of  selected  states.  The  Commissions  covered  under 
this analysis are Ninth to Twelfth Finance Commissions. It is observed 
that  while  direct  taxes  are  underestimated  in  general,  revenues  from 
indirect taxes partially Union excise duties and custom duties have been 
over  estimated.  In  respect  of  states,  four  selected  states  viz.,  Andhra 
Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Orissa  and  Assam  are  examined.  While  there  is 
similarity between the approaches of Ninth, Tenth and Twelfth Finance 
Commissions in regard to middle and high income states, the Eleventh 
Finance Commission required that they raise tax revenues higher than 
what they were able to achieve. 
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Under  the  constitutional  provisions,  the  Finance  Commissions  are 
required to determine the shares of divisible central taxes for each state. 
However, in order to determine the grants under article 275, the Finance 
Commissions follow a methodology that requires forecasts of states‟ non 
tax revenues as well as the shares of central taxes that will accrue to the 
states  be  forecasted.  This  is  because  the  revenue  gap  grants  are 
determined as the difference between the assessed needs and assessed 
own tax and non-tax revenues as well as the respective shares in central 
taxes during the recommendation period. The quality of the forecasts of 
central taxes is quite important for the determination of the amount of 
grants  that  are  fixed  in  nominal  terms.  If  the  share  of  states  in  the 
central taxes is overestimated, grants would be less than what is actually 
required.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  states‟  shares  in  central  taxes  are 
underestimated, larger grants would be recommended as compared to 
what is actually required. We have considered four states, viz., Andhra 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa and Assam to examine the relationship between 
assessed own tax revenues and actual own tax revenues for these states. 
 
  The paper is organised in four sections. Section 1 discusses the 
methodology  of  forecast  evaluation.  Section  2  analyses  the  forecast 
errors of central tax revenues by Finance Commissions. Section 3 makes 
a comparison of state‟s own tax revenue assessment with actuals for four 
states. The final part of the paper summaries the findings.   
   
1. Methodology of Forecast Evaluation 
In  this  section,  we  briefly  describe  the  methodology  for  measuring 
forecast errors and the diagnostic checks used for this analysis. Once a 
forecast  series  Pt  and  a  series  of  realizations  At  for  t  =  1,2,…n  are 
available, there are various ways to describe how closely the predictions 
emulate the realizations. Many of the descriptive measures of forecast  
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accuracy can be defined with reference to levels of variables as well as 
changes in the levels.  
 
  The mean square error and the root mean square errors are the 
frequently  used  summary  measures  of  forecast  accuracy.  These  are 
defined respectively as  
  Mp = [ 1/n   ((Pt – At)
2 ] and RMSQ = √ Mp                    
   
  These  have  a  minimum  value  of  zero  in  the  case  of  perfect 
forecasts. There is no upper limit. Their inadequacy lies in not having a 
proper unit of measurement. They give the same weight to a deviation 
whether  a  variable  is  measured  in  rupees  or  crore  of  rupees  or 
percentages. They however, have interesting mathematical and statistical 
properties and lend themselves to useful decompositions.  
 
  Another summary measure is Theil‟s inequality coefficient [Theil 
(1961,  1966)].  This  is  also  based  on  the  mean  square  error.  But,  in 
addition, a suitable unit of measurement is provided. It is defined with 
respect to levels as well as changes in levels. 
 
   Levels: U = [  ((Pt – At)




With respect to changes, Theil‟s inequality coefficient may be defined as 
follows:  
               Uc1 = [Σ (  Pt  -   A t) 
2] 
½ 
                          (Σ   A t 
2) 
½ 
  The intuitive basis of these measures is the belief that the more 
closely  predictions  follow  realizations,  the  better  they  are.  This  must 
however  be  qualified  by  the  consideration  that  for  all  stochastic 
processes, forecasts will be made with errors even if all the information in 
the universe is used (Granger, 1973). In such a case, optimal predictors 
are not necessarily those where the variances of predictions are equal to 
the  variance  of  realizations.  The  point  has  been  illustrated  by  
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decomposing  the  expected  squared  forecast  error  in  the  following 
manner  
  S = E (P- A)
2 = ( μP – μA)
2 +  σ
2 
P  + σ
2
A – 2 ρ σ P  σ A 
where μP, μA and ơp and ơA are respectively the population means and 
variances  of  predictions  and  realizations  and  ρ  is  the  correlation 
coefficient. Assuming S to be a function of μP, ơp and ρ, the following 
necessary  conditions  for  minimizing  S  can  be  obtained.  Thus  S  is 
minimised by taking ρ as large as possible with μP =  μA and ơp = ρ ơA. 
Thus, whereas the mean of the two series should coincide, the variances 
need not be equal.  
 
  Apart  from  ranking  forecasts,  a  comparison  of  predictions  and 
realizations may also be used for diagnostic checks on the forecasting 
procedures  with  a  view  to  modify.  Some  insight  into  the  nature  of 
prediction  errors  is  obtained  by  regressing  realizations  as  shown  in  
















Chart 1: Errors of Bias and Slope 
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  At =   +  Pt + Ut                                                                                    
 
  A zero value of   means that the regression line passes through 
the origin, and a unit value of   means that it coincides with the line of 
perfect forecasts (LPF). In the case of unit correlation between Pt and At, 
we expect the two means to coincide (μP = μA) and   = 1. Thus, the non-
zero  values  of    and  non-unity  values  of    have  been  interpreted  as 
'systematic' errors in the forecast.  
 
  We observe that the mean point (μP, μA) does not lie on the LPF. 
This is a source of systematic bias and can be removed by shifting the 
regression line until the mean point lies on the LPF. As it is desirable for 
the mean point to be on the LPF, so also it is intuitively desirable that the 
whole regression line coincides with the LPF. If this is so, the forecast is 
called efficient (Mincer and Zarnotwitz, 1969).  
 
  Theil (1961) has suggested that the mean square error MP can 
be decomposed as follows 
  MP =  ( μP – μA)
2 + (Sp – r S A)




where μP and μA are the sample means of predictions and realizations, SP 
and SA are their standard deviations and r is the correlation coefficient 
between them.  The division of the terms on the right-hand side by the 
mean square error gives rise to the following quantities which have been 
called „inequality proportions‟ 
  U
M  =  ( μP – μA)
2 / MP               mean proportion 
  U
R  =  (SP – r SA)
2 / MP      slope proportion 
  U
D  =  (1-r
2) S
2
A / MP                disturbance proportion 
 
The terms thus provide information on the relative importance of 
different sources of error rather than another. The mean proportion has a 
positive value if μP   μA. This is due therefore to 'bias'. The deviation of 
SP from r SA is due to slope error, and the third term is a disturbance 
component.   
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2. Analysing Forecast Errors of Central Tax Revenues by Finance  
Commissions 
For  looking  at  the  quality  of  forecasts  implicit  in  the  assessments 
undertaken by the Finance Commissions, we consider  recommendation 
periods  under  the  Ninth  to  Twelfth  Finance  Commissions.  For  the 
Seventh  and  Eighth  Commissions,  there  is  information  only  about  the 
assumed  growth  rates  for  given  central  taxes.  For  the  Ninth  Finance 
Commission, the First Report covered one year (1989-90) and the Second 
Report, five years (1990-95). For the Twelfth Finance Commission, we 
consider the first three years viz., 2005-06 to 2007-08. In all cases we 
make  a  comparison  of  Finance  Commission  forecasts  of  central  tax 
revenues against the corresponding actuals. This exercise has been done 
for the following taxes: income tax, corporation tax, union excise duties, 
customs duties and centre‟s total gross tax revenues.   
 
a. Income Tax 
Table 1 gives a comparison of income tax revenues as projected by the 
Finance  Commissions  against  the  corresponding  actuals  alongwith  the 
absolute  and  percentage  errors  involved  in  these  projections.  For  the 
Ninth  Finance  Commission  period,  there  was  an  underestimation  of 
income  tax  revenues  in  all  the  years.  This  underestimation  grew  over 
time and it was as high as 43 percent by 1994-95, which was the last 
year of the projection period. For the Tenth Finance Commission period 
also,  there  was  implicit  underestimation  but  the  extent  of  error  was 
comparatively less ranging from a minimum of 1.6 percent to a maximum 
of 19.3 percent. For the Eleventh Finance Commission period, the nature 
of error changed. The Finance Commission overestimated the income tax 
revenue of the central government in four out of five years. However, for 
the first year, the forecast was very close to the actuals, the extent of 
error  being  0.5  percent.  For  the  remaining  four  years  the  extent  of 
overestimation  ranged  from  17.3  to  27.9  percent.  For  the  Twelfth 
Finance Commission, the extent of error is negligible for the first year 
being close to zero percent. For the second and third years, there is an  
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underestimation. Chart 2 indicates the departures of Finance Commission 
projections against the actuals. Chart 3 gives the percentage error for 
projections for income tax revenues. The percentage error was less than 
5 percent only in two years during the period from 1989-90 to 2007-08. 
It was between 8 to 10 percent in only one year. It was between 10 to 
20 percent in five years. In all the remaining years, the forecast error 
















































































Chart 3: Income Tax: Percentage Error 
 
 
Table 1: Forest Errors: Income Tax 
                                                                      (Rs. crore) 
Years   FC Projections 
(P) 
Actuals (A)  A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  3915  5004.0  1089.0  21.8 
1990-91  4670  5377.1  707.1  13.2 
1991-92  5136  6731.1  1595.1  23.7 
1992-93  5650  7895.7  2245.7  28.4 
1993-94  6215  9122.6  2907.6  31.9 
1994-95  6837  12029.3  5192.3  43.2 
1995-96  12860  15591.8  2731.8  17.5 
1996-97  14712  18231.0  3519.0  19.3 
1997-98  16831  17097.0  266.0  1.6 
1998-99  19154  20240.3  1086.3  5.4 
1999-00  21682  25654.5  3972.5  15.5 
2000-01  31590  31764.0  174.0  0.5 
2001-02   37545  32004.0  -5541.0  -17.3 
2002-03  44622  36866.0  -7756.0  -21.0 
2003-04  53033  41387.0  -11646.0  -28.1 
2004-05  63030  49268.0  -13762.0  -27.9 
2005-06  55981  55985.0  4.0  0.0 
2006-07  65386  75093.0  9707.0  12.9 
2007-08  76371  118320.0  41949.0  35.5 
Source (Basic Data): Budget Documents and Reports of the Finance Commission.  
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          Table 2 gives Commission wise summary statistics for the extent 
of error in regards to income tax in terms of the root mean square error 
and Theil inequality coefficient. Measured by these, the best forecasts are 
given  by  the  Tenth  Finance  Commission  followed  by  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth Finance Commissions. Among these four Commissions, as far as 
income tax is concerned, the least satisfactory forecast was given by the 
Ninth  Finance  Commission.  It  will  further  be  seen  that  the  most 
important reason for forecast error was mis-prediction of the mean of the 
forecasted  variable.  Error  of  bias  (difference  between  predicted  and 
actual means) is able to explain 71 to 74 percent of the mean square 
error.     
 
As  for  as  the  Eighth,  Ninth  and  the  Eleventh  Finance 
Commissions  0are  concerned  the  least  bias  is  shown  by  the  Twelfth 
Finance  Commission  but  even  here  it  accounts  for  50  percent  of  the 
mean square error. The forecast done by Tenth Finance Commission was 
the most efficient in the sense that the slope error was close to zero. The 
contribution  of  the  slope  error  is  the  highest  for  the  Twelfth  Finance 
Commission. 
 






Tenth  Eleventh  Twelfth 
(3 years) 
RMSQ  2949.6  2715.8  9120.4  24859.2 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.345  0.138  0.235  0.285 
Decomposition of Mean Square Error     
Bias  0.735  0.727  0.714  0.480 
Slope   0.249  0.001  0.267  0.487 
Covariance  0.0157  0.2728  0.0188  0.0334 
Sum  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 





b. Union Excise Duties 
Until the 80
th constitutional amendment, which made the sharing of all 
central taxes possible with the states, the Union excise duties provided 
the other important shareable tax for the state governments.  Leaving 
1989-90 (First Report of the Ninth Finance Commission), for all the years 
during 1990-91 to 2007-08, revenues from the Union excise duties were 
over-projected  by  the  Finance  Commissions  and  there  was  always  a 
shortfall in the actuals as compared to the projected amounts (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Forecast Errors: Union Excise Duties 
  (Rs. crore) 
Years 
  
FC Projections (P)  Actuals 
(A) 
A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  20670  22406.3  1736.3  7.75 
1990-91  25426  24514.4  -911.6  -3.7 
1991-92  28477  28109.8  -367.2  -1.3 
1992-93  31894  30831.5  -1062.5  -3.4 
1993-94  35721  31696.6  -4024.4  -12.7 
1994-95  40008  37347.2  -2660.8  -7.1 
1995-96  45822  40187.3  -5634.8  -14.0 
1996-97  52420  45007.8  -7412.2  -16.5 
1997-98  59969  47961.6  -12007.4  -25.0 
1998-99  68245  53246.2  -14998.8  -28.2 
1999-00  77254  61901.8  -15352.2  -24.8 
2000-01  73452  68526.1  -4925.9  -7.2 
2001-02   84911  72555.0  -12356.0  -17.0 
2002-03  98157  82310  -15847.0  -19.3 
2003-04  113469  90774  -22695.0  -25.0 
2004-05  131170  99125  -32045.0  -32.3 
2005-06  114741  111226  -3515.0  -3.2 
2006-07  127133  117613  -9520.0  -8.1 
2007-08  140864  127947  -12917.0  -10.1 
Source (Basic Data): Budget Documents and Reports of the Finance Commission. 
   
  The extent of this shortfall was the highest for the Tenth and 
Eleventh Finance Commissions and more limited for the Ninth and Tenth  
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Finance  Commission  periods.  There  are  four  years  out  of  this  period 
when the forecast error was less 5 percent of the corresponding actual. 
Chart 4 shows that the projected tax revenues were almost always higher 
than the corresponding actuals and that the error was least in the initial 
years  of  the  Finance  Commission  award  periods.  The  extent  of  error 
progressively increased as time increased and this pattern is repeated for 


































Chart 4: Union Excise Duties: FC Forecasts and Actuals 
 
  Chart  5  shows  the  pattern  of  percentage  error  for  the  Union 
excise duties. The summary measures of forecast error indicate that in 
terms of the Theil inequality coefficient, the smallest error were for the 
Ninth and Twelfth Finance Commission periods. The magnitudes of errors 
are particularly large for the last 3 years of both the Tenth and Eleventh 
Finance  Commission  periods.  An  analysis  of  the  mean  square  error  in 
terms of decomposition once again shows that the systematic error of 
bias in mis-predicting the mean of the forecasted series was very largely 






































Tenth  Eleventh  Twelfth 
 (3 
Years) 
RMSQ  2252.6  11760.3  19849.5  9483.9 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.073  0.234  0.238  0.080 
Decomposition of Mean Square Error     
Bias  0.642  0.888  0.784  0.832 
Slope   0.202  0.104  0.214  0.162 
Covariance  0.1556  0.0086  0.0024  0.0059 
Sum  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
















Chart 5: Union Excise Duties: Percentage Error 
 
c. Corporation Tax 
Table 5 indicates the forecast errors in the case of corporation tax. For 
the  corporation  tax,  the  projection  errors  were  smallest  for  the  
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projections given by the Tenth Finance Commission although all of these 
represented underestimation (Charts 6 and 7). For the Eleventh Finance 
Commission, for four out of five years there were over-projections. For 
the Ninth and Twelfth Finance Commissions there was under-projection 
and the magnitude of errors seem to increase in the later years of the 
respective  recommendation  periods.  Except  for  the  Eleventh  Finance 
Commission, as shown by Table 6, the bias error was rather large for the 
Ninth,  Tenth  and  Twelfth  Finance  Commissions  and  the  slope  error  is 
relatively high for the Twelfth Finance Commission.  
 
Table 5: Forecast Errors: Corporation tax 
Years  FC Projections (P)  Actuals 
(A) 
A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  4630.0  4728.9  98.9  2.1 
1990-91  5326.0  5335.3  9.3  0.2 
1991-92  5965.0  7853.0  1888.0  24.0 
1992-93  6681.0  8898.5  2217.5  24.9 
1993-94  7483.0  10060.1  2577.1  25.6 
1994-95  8381.0  13821.8  5440.8  39.4 
1995-96  14586.0  16487.1  1901.1  11.5 
1996-97  16949.0  18566.6  1617.6  8.7 
1997-98  19695.0  20016.0  321.0  1.6 
1998-99  22753.0  24529.1  1776.1  7.2 
1999-00  26132.0  30692.3  4560.3  14.9 
2000-01  37978.0  35696.3  -2281.7  -6.4 
2001-02   45384.0  36609.0  -8775.0  -24.0 
2002-03  54233.0  46172.0  -8061.0  -17.5 
2003-04  64809.0  63562.0  -1247.0  -2.0 
2004-05  77447.0  82680.0  5233.0  6.3 
2005-06  96845.0  101277.0  4432.0  4.4 
2006-07  116601.0  144318.0  27717.0  19.2 
2007-08  140388.0  186125.0  45737.0  24.6 















































































Tenth  Eleventh  Twelfth 
(3 Years) 
RMSQ  2990.8  2461.1  5935.1  30982.5 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.311  0.109  0.106  0.209 
Decomposition of Theil Inequality Coefficient   
Bias  0.658  0.684  0.260  0.702 
Slope   0.303  0.118  0.361  0.293 
Covariance  0.0383  0.1984  0.3792  0.0048 
Sum  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Source (Basic Data): Budget Documents and Reports of the Finance Commission. 
 
d. Customs Duties 
In  the  case  of  customs  duties,  out  of  the  nineteen  years  under 
consideration,  there  was  an  underestimation  for  twelve  years.  This 
related to most of the years covered by the Ninth Finance Commission, 
all the years covered by the Eleventh Finance Commission and two of the 
years  covered  by  the  Tenth  Finance  Commission.  It  is  clear  that  the 
impact of custom duty reforms undertaken in the  nineties, particularly 
since  the  latter  half  of  the  nineties,  where  the  peak  tariff  rates  were 
brought down significantly to bring these in line with internationally more 
competitive  levels,  was  not  fully  taken  into  account  by  the  Finance 
Commissions.  In  fact,  for  the  years  covered  by  the  Eleventh  Finance 
Commission, the errors have been as large as 52 -65 percent (Table 7). 
Charts  8  and  9  provide  a  comparison  of  projections  of  customs  duty 
revenues by the Finance Commission and the corresponding actuals and 
the related percentage errors, respectively. 





























Table 7: Forecast Errors: Customs Duty Revenues 
  (Rs. crore) 
Years    FC Projections (P)  Actuals (A)  A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  18529  18036.13  -492.87  -2.73 
1990-91  20473  20643.8  170.8  0.8 
1991-92  23441  22256.7  -1184.3  -5.3 
1992-93  26840  23776.4  -3063.6  -12.9 
1993-94  30732  22192.7  -8539.3  -38.5 
1994-95  35188  26789.1  -8398.9  -31.4 
1995-96  29901  35756.8  5855.8  16.4 
1996-97  34208  42851.0  8643.0  20.2 
1997-98  39135  40192.8  1057.8  2.6 
1998-99  44537  40668.3  -3868.7  -9.5 
1999-00  50417  48420.0  -1997.0  -4.1 
2000-01  53572  47542.2  -6029.8  -12.7 
2001-02   61233  40268.0  -20965.0  -52.1 
2002-03  69989  44852  -25137.0  -56.0 
2003-04  79998  48629  -31369.0  -64.5 
2004-05  91437  57611  -33826.0  -58.7 
2005-06  58156  65067  6911.0  10.6 
2006-07  62343  86327  23984.0  27.8 
2007-08  66832  100766  33934.0  33.7 












































Chart 9: Customs Duties: Percentage Error 
 
  An analysis of the decomposition of the summary measures of 
forecast errors indicates that the error of bias, i.e., mis-prediction of the 
means accounted for nearly 85 percent of the total error as far as the 
Eleventh Finance Commission was concerned. In the case of the Twelfth 
Finance  Commission  also,  although  we  now  have  a  case  of  over 
estimation, the error of bias accounts for nearly 79 percent of the total 
error (Table 8). 
     







Tenth  Eleventh  Twelfth  
(3 years) 
RMSQ  5554.8  5080.7  25440.0  24320.8 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.239  0.122  0.529  0.285 
Decomposition of Theil Inequality Coefficient   
Bias  0.573  0.146  0.851  0.789 
Slope   0.387  0.615  0.128  0.204 
Covariance  0.0405  0.2393  0.0215  0.0061 
Sum  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Source (Basic Data): Budget Documents and Reports of the Finance Commission.  
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e. Total Central Tax Revenues 
While the quality of projections of individual taxes like income tax and 
Union  excise  duties  was  material  upto  the  Ninth  Finance  Commission, 
since the application of the global sharing mechanism of all central taxes 
except  earmarked  cesses  and  surcharges  after  the  80
th  Constitution 
amendment,  it  is  the  quality  of  projection  of  the  overall  central  tax 
revenues,  which  is  critical.  Some  of  the  individual  errors  of  over-
estimation and under estimation may cancel out and for the central tax 
revenues  as  a  whole  the  mis-prediction  may  be  more  limited  in  its 
impact.  Table 9 and Chart 10 give a comparison of Finance Commission 
projections and corresponding actuals for total central tax revenues. 
 
Table 9: Forecast Errors: Total Central Tax Revenues 
    (Rs. crore) 
Years 
 
Total Central Tax Revenues 
FC Projections (P)  Actuals (A)  A-P  (A-P)/A(%) 
1989-90  49000.0  51636.0  2636.0  5.1 
1990-91  57356.0  57577.0  221.0  0.4 
1991-92  64670.0  67361.0  2691.0  4.0 
1992-93  72931.0  74636.0  1705.0  2.3 
1993-94  82260.0  75742.0  -6518.0  -8.6 
1994-95  92797.0  92297.0  -500.0  -0.5 
1995-96  106022.0  111224.0  5202.0  4.7 
1996-97  121637.0  128762.0  7125.0  5.5 
1997-98  139559.0  139221.0  -338.0  -0.2 
1998-99  159299.0  143797.0  -15502.0  -10.8 
1999-00  180894.0  171752.0  -9142.0  -5.3 
2000-01  198226.0  188603.0  -9623.0  -5.1 
2001-02   230961.0  187060.0  -43901.0  -23.5 
2002-03  269185.0  216266.0  -52919.0  -24.5 
2003-04  313833.0  254348.0  -59485.0  -23.4 
2004-05  366002.0  304958.0  -61044.0  -20.0 
2005-06  343703.0  366151.0  22448.0  6.1 
2006-07  393140.0  473512.0  80372.0  17.0 
2007-08  450597.0  585410.0  134813.0  23.0 
















































Chart 10: Total Central Tax Revenues: FC Forecasts and Actuals 
 
 
  The  percentage  errors  (Chart  11)  for  the  Ninth  Finance 
Commission period were limited in the range of 0.4 percent to (-) 6.8 
percent with signs changing within the forecast period. In the case of the 
Tenth Finance Commission, the errors range between (-) 10.8 percent to 
5.5 percent with errors changing sign within the forecast period. For the 
Eleventh  Finance  Commission  period,  for  all  the  years,  there  is  an 
overestimation and errors range between (–) 5.1 to (–) 24.5 percent. For 
the Twelfth Finance Commission also, the errors range between 6.1 to 23 

















































Chart 11: Total Central Tax Revenues: Percentage Error 
 
 







Tenth  Eleventh  Twelfth  
(3 Years) 
RMSQ  3253.7  8964.7  49163.3  91538.9 
Theil Inequality 
Coefficient 
0.044  0.064  0.210  0.189 
Decomposition of Theil Inequality Coefficient   
Bias  0.022  0.080  0.853  0.749 
Slope   0.211  0.653  0.105  0.250 
Covariance  0.7668  0.2675  0.0422  0.0009 
Sum  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Source (Basic Data): Budget Documents and Reports of the Finance Commission. 
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  As indicated by Table 10, the error of bias was the largest for the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Finance commission whereas the slope error was 
the largest for the Tenth Finance Commission and the covariance error 
was the largest for the Ninth Finance Commission.  
 
 
Table 11: Analysis of Difference between Actual and Assumed 
Growth Rates and Buoyancies in Finance Commission 
Projections 


























   (percent per annum)  (units)  (percent per annum)  (units) 
1990-91  11.0  17.05  1.55  16.80  11.51  0.68 
1991-92  11.0  12.75  1.16  14.94  16.99  1.14 
1992-93  11.0  12.77  1.16  14.95  10.80  0.72 
1993-94  11.0  12.79  1.16  15.04  1.48  0.10 
1994-95  11.0  12.81  1.16  17.32  21.86  1.26 
Average  11.00  13.64  1.24  15.81  12.53  0.78 
1995-96  12.5  15.32  1.23  17.33  20.51  1.18 
1996-97  12.0  14.73  1.23  15.67  15.77  1.01 
1997-98  12.0  14.73  1.23  10.77  8.12  0.75 
1998-99  11.5  14.14  1.23  14.67  3.29  0.22 
1999-00  11.0  13.56  1.23  11.47  19.44  1.70 
Average  11.80  14.50  1.23  13.98  13.43  0.97 
2000-01  13.0  16.62  1.28  7.70  9.81  1.27 
2001-02   13.0  16.51  1.27  8.50  -0.82  -0.10 
2002-03  13.0  16.55  1.27  7.76  15.61  2.01 
2003-04  13.0  16.59  1.28  12.51  17.61  1.41 
2004-05  13.0  16.62  1.28  13.06  19.90  1.52 
Average  13.00  16.58  1.28  9.91  12.42  1.22 
2005-06  12.0  20.07  1.67  14.51  20.07  1.38 
2006-07  12.0  29.32  2.44  15.79  29.32  1.86 
Average  12.00  24.69  2.06  15.15  24.69  1.62 
Source (Basic Data): Finance Commission Reports and Central Budget Documents. 
Note: For the first year of the forecasts of the Finance Commissions, we have taken the 
base year figures as estimated by the Finance Commissions rather than the forecast 
for the last year.   of the preceding Finance Commission. 
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  In Table 11, we undertake an analysis as to whether the source 
of  error  was  mis-prediction  of  growth  rate  of  tax  revenues  or  mis 
prediction of tax buoyancy. This analysis has been done for only the total 
central  tax  revenues.  It  can  be  seen  that  for  the  Ninth  Finance 
Commission, it was the GDP growth rate that was under-projected and 
the buoyancy was over-predicted by a large margin. In the case of Tenth 
Finance Commission, the nature of the error is the same although the 
differences are less. In the case of Eleventh Finance Commission, the 
underestimation arose primarily because the actual growth rate turned 
out to be much lower than what was assumed. In the early part of the 
decade, the Indian economy experienced low growth rates as well as low 
inflation rates.  
 
  The  assumed  buoyancy  for  the  Eleventh  Finance  Commission 
period comes very close to the actual buoyancy. In the case of Twelfth 
Finance  Commission,  the  growth  rate  is  underestimated.  None  of  the 
Finance  Commissions  are  able  to  pick  up  the  volatility  in  GDP  growth 
rates  and  also  the  volatility  in  tax  buoyancies.  They  tend  to  assume 
constant or nearly constant growth rates as well as constant buoyancies. 
While this may be done, it is important to clearly identify whether the 
recommendation period will have years containing a large part of either a 
boom or a trough in respect of the growth of GDP.  
 
3.    Comparison  of  State’s  Own  Tax  Revenue  Assessment  with 
Actuals: Selected      States 
In  this  section,  we  look  at  the  comparison  of  Finance  Commission‟s 
assessments  of  own  tax  revenues  of  selected  states  and  the 
corresponding actuals. For this analysis, we have selected four states, 
viz.,  Andhra  Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Orissa,  and  Assam.  These  represent 
middle-, high-, low-income and special category states, respectively. It 
may  be  noted  that  the  assessment  of  own  tax  revenue  by  a  Finance 
Commission may not be taken as a forecast. Instead it should be taken 
as  containing  normative  or  prescriptive  elements  indicating  what  the  
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concerned  state  is  expected  to  raise  in  terms  of  own  tax  revenues 
following  certain  norms  rather  that  what  it  is  likely  to  raise.  The 
departures of assessed amounts compared to the corresponding actual 
may  be  interpreted  as  underperformance  or  better  than  prescribed 
performance as the case may be.   
 
Table 12: Andhra Pradesh Own Tax Revenue:  
Finance Commission Projections and Actuals 
                                                                             (Rs. crore) 
  FC Projections  Actuals  A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  2465.4  2384.1  -81.2  -3.4 
1990-91  2707.4  2647.2  -60.2  -2.3 
1991-92  2973.3  3055.0  81.7  2.7 
1992-93  3265.2  3388.7  123.5  3.6 
1993-94  3585.8  3832.9  247.1  6.4 
1994-95  3937.9  4227.4  289.6  6.9 
1995-96  4232.3  4120.4  -111.9  -2.7 
1996-97  4793.2  4881.8  88.6  1.8 
1997-98  5432.6  7113.5  1680.9  23.6 
1998-99  6131.4  7961.4  1830.0  23.0 
1999-00  6889.7  9008.6  2119.0  23.5 
2000-01  11028.0  10551.9  -476.1  -4.5 
2001-02   13112.3  11550.6  -1561.7  -13.5 
2002-03  15590.5  12617.6  -2972.9  -23.6 
2003-04  18537.1  13805.9  -4731.2  -34.3 
2004-05  22040.6  16254.5  -5786.1  -35.6 
2005-06  19543.0  19207.4  -335.6  -1.7 
2006-07  22123.0  23926.2  1803.2  7.5 
2007-08  25043.0  31401.6  6358.6  20.2 
Source (Basic Data): Budget Documents and Reports of the Finance Commission. 
 
a. Andhra Pradesh 
In the case of Andhra Pradesh the comparison of Finance Commission 
projections with actuals indicates an interesting difference between the 
approaches of different Finance Commissions. While the Ninth, Tenth and 
Twelfth Finance Commissions had assessed own tax revenues of Andhra 






























Commission  had  prescribed  tax  performance  much  higher  than  what 
Andhra  Pradesh  was  able  to  achieve.    This  pattern  is  summarised  in 
















Chart 12: Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission 
Projections and Actuals: Andhra Pradesh 
 
  As indicated in Table 13 and Chart 13 the pattern of differences 
in the Finance Commission assessment and the corresponding actual for 
Gujarat is similar to that of Andhra Pradesh in as much as except the 
Eleventh Finance Commission, the projection by Finance Commission was 
lower than the corresponding actual indicating that the Ninth, Tenth and 
Twelfth Finance Commissions did not take into account the higher than 
average  tax  effort  of  Gujarat  also.  This  is  in  line  with  what  would  be 
expected if the equalization principle is applied because in these cases 
the extra revenue arising from the application of more than average tax 
effort  was  not  taken  into  account  while  considering  the  issue  of 
determining grants. In the case of Eleventh Finance Commission much 
higher tax effort was expected from these examples of middle and high 




























Table 13: Gujarat Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission 
 Projections and Actuals 
                                                                              (Rs. crore) 
  FC Projections  Actuals  A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  1876.5  2159.7  283.2  13.1 
1990-91  2088.9  2399.8  311.0  13.0 
1991-92  2325.2  2893.4  568.2  19.6 
1992-93  2588.3  3456.5  868.3  25.1 
1993-94  2881.1  3941.7  1060.6  26.9 
1994-95  3207.1  4742.9  1535.7  32.4 
1995-96  5125.8  5322.9  197.1  3.7 
1996-97  5809.1  6066.0  256.8  4.2 
1997-98  6589.8  6590.5  0.7  0.0 
1998-99  7446.7  7615.2  168.5  2.2 
1999-00  8380.8  8161.7  -219.1  -2.7 
2000-01  10481.9  9046.8  -1435.1  -15.9 
2001-02  12463.0  9236.8  -3226.1  -34.9 
2002-03  14818.5  9520.5  -5298.0  -55.6 
2003-04  17619.1  11173.4  -6445.7  -57.7 
2004-05  20949.2  12957.6  -7991.6  -61.7 
2005-06  13896.5  15697.9  1801.4  11.5 
2006-07  16208.9  18464.6  2255.7  12.2 
2007-08  18906.0  21472.5  2566.5  12.0 














Chart 13: Gujarat Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission 
Projections and Actuals  
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  In the case of Orissa much lower than actual tax revenue was 
expected by the Ninth, Eleventh and Twelfth Finance Commissions. It is 
only the Tenth Finance Commission that required Orissa to raise its tax 
effort.  In  terms  of  relative  departures  of  projections  from  actuals  the 
minimum deviation was in the case of the Eleventh Finance Commission 
(refer Table 14 and Chart 14). 
 
Table 14: Orissa Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission 
Projections and Actuals 
(Rs. crore) 
   FC Projections  Actuals  A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1989-90  399.5  524.8  125.3  23.9 
1990-91  450.7  668.8  218.1  32.6 
1991-92  508.5  673.6  165.1  24.5 
1992-93  573.7  761.9  188.2  24.7 
1993-94  647.3  859.9  212.6  24.7 
1994-95  730.2  922.6  192.4  20.9 
1995-96  1270.4  1127.2  -143.2  -12.7 
1996-97  1418.0  1342.0  -76.0  -5.7 
1997-98  1586.8  1421.7  -165.1  -11.6 
1998-99  1772.0  1487.1  -284.8  -19.2 
1999-00  1973.7  1704.1  -269.6  -15.8 
2000-01  2012.2  2184.0  171.8  7.9 
2001-02   2302.0  2466.9  164.9  6.7 
2002-03  2633.5  2871.8  238.4  8.3 
2003-04  3012.7  3301.7  289.0  8.8 
2004-05  3446.5  4176.6  730.1  17.5 
2005-06  4358.2  5002.3  644.1  12.9 
2006-07  4933.5  6065.1  1131.6  18.7 
2007-08  5584.7  6792.9  1208.2  17.8 






















































Chart 14: Orissa Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission 
Projections and Actuals 
 
  In the case of Assam the year wise amounts for the assessed tax 
under the normative exercise of the Ninth Finance Commission are not 
available  because  these  were  applied  only  to  fourteen  major  general 
category  states.  A  comparison  between  Tenth,  Eleventh  and  Twelfth 
Finance Commissions indicates that while the Tenth Finance Commission 
expected Assam to raise its tax effort, the Eleventh Finance Commission 
assessed  the  tax  revenue  at  amounts  lower  than  what  the  state  was 
actually able to achieve. In the case of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
for the first two years of the award period the difference between actual 


























Table 15: Assam Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission 
 Projections and Actuals 
(Rs. crore) 
   FC Projections  Actuals  A-P  (A-P)/A (%) 
1995-96  794.3  702.5  -91.9  -13.1 
1996-97  891.8  766.9  -124.9  -16.3 
1997-98  1002.9  881.9  -121.0  -13.7 
1998-99  1125.0  982.6  -142.4  -14.5 
1999-00  1258.0  1224.8  -33.3  -2.7 
2000-01  1269.5  1409.7  140.2  9.9 
2001-02   1437.1  1556.9  119.9  7.7 
2002-03  1626.8  1934.5  307.7  15.9 
2003-04  1841.5  2070.3  228.8  11.1 
2004-05  2084.6  2713.3  628.7  23.2 
2005-06  3125.5  3232.2  106.8  3.3 
2006-07  3538.0  3483.3  -54.7  -1.6 
2007-08  4005.0  3511.8  -493.3  -14.0 
















Chart 15: Assam Own Tax Revenue: Finance Commission  
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Projections and Actuals 
 
4. Conclusions 
Finance Commissions in India require to make their recommendations for 
a period of five years based on information about central and state fiscal 
aggregates  that  are  generally  dated.  Between  the  last  year  of  the 
recommendation period and the last year for which accounts data are 
available,  the  gap  could  be  seven  to  eight  years.  The  Finance 
Commissions have to make forecasts for various  fiscal aggregates and 
then  determine  grants  that  are  specified  in  absolute  amounts.  In  this 
paper, we have looked at the nature of forecast error in the forecast of 
central revenues and assessment of own tax revenues for four selected 
states for Ninth to Twelfth Finance commissions. It turns out that most of 
the Finance Commission have underestimated the central revenues but 
some have overestimated these. 
 
Some of the findings are highlighted below: 
1.  For income tax, for the period 1989-90 to 2007-08, revenues were 
underestimated for 15 out of nineteen years. The percentage error 
ranged  from  (-)  28.1  percent  to  43.2  percent.  The  four  years  of 
overestimation are all in the recommendation period of the Eleventh 
Finance Commission. 
2.  In  the  case  of  the  Union  excise  duties,  the  revenues  were 
overestimated by all Commissions. For 18 out of 19 years analyzed 
here, there was overestimation. The error of overestimation ranges 
from (-) 1.3 to (-) 32.3 percent. 
3.  In the case of corporation tax, there was under-estimation except for 
4 years under the Eleventh Finance Commission. 
4.  In the case of customs duties, there was over estimation in 12 out of 
19 years. 
5.  For  total  central  taxes  revenues,  for  10  years  there  is  under-
estimation and for 9 years there is over-estimation. The errors range 
from (-) 24.5 to 23.0 percent.  
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6.  The extent of percentage error increases, as we move towards the 
later years in a Commission‟s recommendation period. 
7.  An  analysis  of  errors  indicates  that  almost  always  the  systematic 
error of bias      (mis-prediction of means) accounts for a relatively 
large part of the prediction error. 
8.  A  comparison  between  assessed  own  tax  revenues  and 
corresponding  actual  for  the  period  covered  by  Ninth  to  Twelfth 
Finance  Commission  for  four  selected  states  viz.,  Andhra  Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Orissa and Assam highlights some difference between the 
approaches  followed  by  different  Commissions.  In  particular,  there 
are  similarities  between  the  approaches  of  the  Ninth,  Tenth  and 
Twelfth Finance Commissions in the way middle and higher income 
states were assessed. In contrast the Eleventh Finance Commission 
required that they raise tax revenues much higher than what they 
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